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Adventures in Government History
The Origins of War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten
U-Boat Battles on Canada’s Shores
Roger Sarty

M

ost books are to some extent
autobiographical. They trace
an author’s intellectual journey.
War in the St. Lawrence: The Forgotten
U-Boat Battles on Canada’s Shores 1
is more autobiographical than
many. The journey unfolded over a
period of forty years, although with
numerous and sometimes prolonged
interruptions.
I first became aware of the battle
with the U-boats in the St. Lawrence
in 1972 when the investigative
journalist Peter Moon published
“The Second World War Battle
We Lost At Home” in the Toronto
Star’s Canadian Magazine.2 The piece
was built on interviews with RearAdmiral Paul Hartwig, of West
Germany’s navy. As a young officer
he had commanded U-517, far and
away the most successful of the 15
German submarines that operated in
the St. Lawrence during the Second
World War. His U-boat destroyed
nine of the 23 ships sunk by enemy
action in the St. Lawrence. Hartwig’s
skill and boldness did much to
convince an alarmed Canadian public
and discouraged Canadian military
commanders that their country’s
maritime forces had been decisively
defeated.
When I began to study naval
history later in the 1970s, I discovered
that the Canadian navy’s own official
histories, published in 1950 and
1952, also classed the St. Lawrence
operations as a defeat.3 Only later,

Abstract: This memoir relates the
author’s formative professional
experience during the early 1980s
when he researched the role of the
Royal Canadian Air Force in the
defence of the Gulf of St. Lawrence
against German submarines during
the Second World War. He undertook
this work at the Directorate of History
at National Defence Headquarters
in Ottawa as a junior member of the
team that assisted W.A.B. Douglas in
the production of The Creation of a
National Air Force, the second volume
of the official history of the RCAF. The
memoir explains the challenges of
this pioneering research on the role
of aircraft in anti-submarine warfare.
That work provided the basis for
further research on anti-submarine
warfare for the directorate’s new
official history of the Royal Canadian
Navy, and inspired the author’s own
recent book War in the St. Lawrence.

when I joined official histories unit
in the Department of National
Defence, did I learn that the navy
histories were incomplete. Still more
incomplete – almost non-existent
– were accounts of the maritime
squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air
Force that had played a critical role in
supporting the navy, not least in the
St. Lawrence.
Only the Canadian Army’s
Second World War historical
program survived deep cuts in the
defence budget in 1947-1948.4 By that
time Dr. Gilbert N. Tucker, the naval
historian, and his team had produced
a fully researched volume on the
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navy’s ”Activities on Shore” covering
such topics as shipbuilding, base
development, and the recruitment
and training of personnel, and the
naval control of merchant shipping.
Tucker refused to rush ahead with
a planned volume on operations at
sea, because his team did not yet
have access to such essential sources
as high level intelligence files and
the captured records of the German
navy. Tucker, in fact, resigned. The
naval staff commissioned Joseph
Schull, a well known popular writer
who was serving as a uniformed
public relations officer, to produce
a book as quickly as possible on the
basis of Canadian operational reports
that had been gathered by the team
during the war. This was the genesis
of Schull’s The Far Distant Ships: An
Official Account of Canadian Naval
Operations in the Second World War.
The air force, by contrast,
abandoned its planned volumes
on the air force’s vast wartime
organization in Canada, including
Eastern Air Command. The latter,
with its headquarters in Halifax,
was the counterpart of the navy’s
Atlantic Coast command, and
was responsible for air operations
in eastern Quebec, the Maritime
Provinces and Newfoundland and as
far out into the Atlantic as its patrol
bombers could reach.
In 1965 the Department of
National Defence combined the Army
Historical Section with the small navy
65
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Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Stacey during
his Second World War appointment
as historian of the Canadian Army
Overseas.
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and air force historical units to create
the Directorate of History (since
1998, the Directorate of History and
Heritage). The department lured
Colonel Charles P. Stacey, historian
of the overseas army in 1941-1945 and
head of the Army Historical Section
until 1959, back from his new teaching
career at the University of Toronto to
set up the new organization. Stacey
quickly established the production of
a full scale history of the air force, the
service whose program has suffered
the greatest setbacks in the cuts of
1947-8, as the directorate’s priority
task.
Stacey, who found the 1960s
version of the government
bureaucracy even more frustrating
than his exasperating experiences in
the 1950s, persuaded Sydney F. Wise
to replace him as director of history in
1966. Wise, a professor of Canadian
history at Queen’s University, had coauthored one of the most successful
textbooks of military history, and
served in the RCAF during the war.
He had started his academic career
by using his veteran benefits to do
a BA in history at the University of
Toronto after he was demobilized
from wartime service; he had then
done graduate work at Queen’s. The
changeover from Stacey, who had
been born in 1906, to Wise, born in
1924, marked a passing of the baton

from one generation to another. 5
The last of the military officers with
potential for senior positions whom
Stacey had mentored as historians
during the war and the 1950s had
retired or were about to. Stacey
recognized the central qualification
for the job was historical expertise,
and for that reason urged that future
directors should be academics with
administrative experience, engaged
as civil servants.
In the system established by
Stacey in the Army Historical Section
and still in place in a somewhat
modified form today, the historical
team was coordinated and mentored
by the ”senior historian.” That person
was responsible for the preparation of
drafts for the director’s revision or his
approval if another of the historians
was to be the author of record.
Wise, in those days when
academically trained military
historians were very rare birds indeed,
recruited as his senior historian a still
rarer bird – a military officer with
academic history qualifications.
W.A.B. Douglas, who was born in
1929 in Southern Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe) and raised in England,
had first come to Canada during
the war as a child evacuee from the

German bombing attacks on London.
He returned to Canada, permanently
as it turned out, shortly after the war
when his widowed mother married
a chaplain in the Canadian Army
overseas. Douglas paid his way
through an undergraduate degree
at the University of Toronto by
joining the University Naval Training
Divisions, and then became a regular
force officer. During a dull posting
in Halifax, he enrolled at Dalhousie
University to do an MA in history
in his own time. His thesis was on
the Royal Navy and Nova Scotia
in the eighteenth century. During
a subsequent posting in Kingston,
he began a PhD, an expansion of
his MA naval topic, under Wise’s
direction at Queen’s. When Wise left
the directorate for a professorship at
Carleton University in 1973, Douglas
retired from the armed forces to
become director of history. By pure
coincidence, the leadership of the
directorate had thus passed from
a former army officer to a former
air force officer and then to a naval
officer who had just got out of
uniform.
Douglas, while working full
time on the air force history, also
pushed deeply into the history of
the Canadian navy in the Second
World War. The two were in fact
complimentary. Douglas took on as
3
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Flying Officer S.F. Wise, at RCAF Station
Summerside, PEI, 1944.

lead author the volume of the air force
history that dealt with the hitherto
virtually unknown organizations
and operations in Canada, 1919-1945.
A central part of the story was the
history of Eastern Air Command,
especially its support to the navy in
escorting convoys and hunting for
enemy submarines in the western and
central north Atlantic. (One grumpy
staff historian grumbled that the early
drafts of the Eastern Air Command
chapters read like a naval history,
with the occasional aircraft buzzing
into the picture and then just as
quickly buzzing out.) This work, in
which German U-boat records and
high level intelligence information
– including new releases by Great
Britain of ”Ultra Top Secret” files
of decrypted German naval signals
– proved of vital importance, and
revealed the limitations of The Far
Distant Ships.
If the sturdily built, deep voiced
Charles Stacey, with his square hands
and clipped moustache, seemed the
stereotypical army colonel, then the
tall, athletic, swaggering Syd Wise
was the embodiment of an air force
pilot. Alec Douglas, as tall as Syd but
slighter in build, courtly in manner
with an accent Canadians call British
and the British call mid-Atlantic,
and a carefully swept thatch of hair
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/7

that has never, ever been cut short
in anything approaching army style,
is every inch the naval officer. And
through the 1970s he promoted the
cause of Canadian naval history –
then virtually a non subject in the
universities and popular literature,
and a low priority in the defence
department. He gave papers at
academic conferences, spoke to naval
veterans’ groups, assisted interested
university professors and students,
and urged the defence department to
approve a fresh operational history of
the navy in the Second World War. I
was hired as a civil service historian
by the directorate in May 1981 in the
first position that was to be assigned
to the new naval project.

Ogilvy Annex

F

irst-time visitors to the Directorate
of History in the early 1980s
were often wide-eyed or laughing.
The wide-eyed - those suspicious
of the secret workings of the
defence establishment - wondered
at what was ”really” going on
that had to be disguised by the
incongruous facilities. Those who
laughed sometimes referred to the
opening sequence of the television
comedy ”Get Smart,” in which
agent Maxwell Smart goes into an
apparently innocuous phone booth,
dials, and drops through a trap door
to ”CONTROL” headquarters, or
the series ”Man from UNCLE” in
which the international intelligence
agency’s offices were hidden above
a tailor shop. The directorate, from
the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s,
was located on the third and fourth
floors of the Ogilvy’s department
store annex on the south-east corner
of Besserer and Nicholas Streets in
Ottawa. One entered the building
through the large appliances and
home wares departments and then
got off the elevator on a floor that had
the appearance of a movie set for a
Second World War spy drama. The

W.A.B. Douglas, who has remained active
in naval history since his retirement as
director of history in 1994, shown here
while lecturing in 2011.

offices were around the outer walls
behind wooden partitions that went
only two-thirds of the way to the
ceiling and had smoked glass for the
top two or three feet. The vast central
space, some thousands of square feet,
was filled with bank after bank of tall
olive-drab file cabinets.
As the new kid, I got the old word
processing technology, a high-bodied
1920s typewriter. The more senior
hands got 1950s era typewriters, with
a special feature that set the margins
automatically. Only the secretaries –
and the director himself – had stateof-the-art technology, IBM ”Selectric”
typewriters, with built-in correction
tape. Some said the people were
also a quirky mix. I always think of
Captain Dick Morrison, a helicopter
pilot with an aviator’s handlebar
moustache and a love of English
literature. McGill University turned
down his proposal to do a PhD
thesis on scatology in Shakespeare’s
English. He was philosophical about
the rejection – ”Shitty subject,” he
concluded. Then there was Dave
Kealy, who had been a regular
officer in the Royal Navy from the
age of 13 in the early 30s, and had
served in destroyers all through the
Second World War before retiring
and immigrating to Canada where
67
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he ultimately joined the Naval
Historical Section. He always had
his watch set for Greenwich Mean
Time, Royal Navy style. At my job
interview there had a bit of upset
when Norman Hillmer, the current
senior historian, objected to Brereton
(”Ben”) Greenhous, the former senior
historian, clipping his finger nails
while we talked. Alec Douglas, who
chaired the interview, gave me a long
suffering look and sighed.
The incident was revealing of
Ben and Norman. Ben, big and burly,
was a native of Shropshire in the
west of England, an area he liked
to remind us whose location on the
once violent Welsh borderlands had
given its people a fighting (some
said, thinking of Ben, cantankerous)
spirit. Ben, who was a few years too
young to have served in the Second
World War, had done his compulsory
national military service during the
late 1940s as a non-commissioned
officer in British Army intelligence.
He had then served as an officer in
the Malayan police and seen combat
during the communist insurgency
during the 1950s. Subsequently he
68 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
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hiked across Afghanistan before
permanently emigrating from
England. His plan had been to go
to New Zealand, but he fetched
up in Ottawa. Carleton University
welcomed him as a student, and
he discovered his gift for historical
research and writing. 6 Norman
Hillmer, by contrast, hailed from
North Toronto. His father had been
a senior official in the Toronto Board
of Education, and Norman had
embarked on a teaching career in the
public school system before he did his
PhD at Cambridge. He prided himself
on his athletic physique and in
summer often appeared at the office
in tennis shorts and a suitably trendy
polo shirt. When he announced that
he had bought a Toyota Camry – then
a little known new model – someone
wondered aloud ”But what car do
Yuppies drive?” Alec immediately
replied, ”Well now it’s a Camry.”
Norman took perverse delight in
his unmilitary background – so
much so that I only later came fully
to appreciate the extent to which
his historical career had blossomed
when, in the 1960s, he was a student

of Charles Stacey’s at the University
of Toronto. He had in fact done his
MA research, on Sir Robert Borden’s
naval policy, under Stacey’s direction.
Norman, an historian of international
relations, downplayed this and
his other notable achievements
in military scholarship. During
a staff seminar to review a draft
chapter of the air force history, the
question came up whether some
material would be accessible to
someone with no specialized military
knowledge. Spontaneously we all
turned to Norman – who beamed at
the acknowledgement, and allowed,
yes he understood the draft perfectly
well. Norman and Ben, both masters
of English style, ran something like
a continuous writing seminar for the
more junior staff, patiently annotating
draft after draft – and suggesting yet
another draft might finally achieve
something approaching clarity and
precision.
Although I was hired for the
future naval history, the volume
on the air force in Canada, 1919-45,
had priority. As part of my training
Alec asked me to look at the role
5
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of Eastern Air Command in the
battle of the St. Lawrence. It seemed
a good way to get my feet wet
without drowning. Alec and Dave
Kealy had spent considerable time
building analytical accounts7 from the
extremely preliminary chronological
”narrative” on the history of Eastern
Air Command that had been prepared
by the original air force historical
team during and immediately after
the war.8 Alec and Dave had their
hands more than full with the largest
and most important story: the role of
Eastern Air Command in the main
theatre of the Battle of the Atlantic,
the sea routes between the major
US and Canadian east coast ports
and Great Britain. The material they
had encountered on the air force’s
role in the gulf suggested that the
air force, like the navy, had given
the gulf a distant second priority
after the defence of the transatlantic
convoys that sustained Britain and
built up the resources needed for
the liberation of Europe in 1943-5. In
fact, the role of the air force in the St.
Lawrence seemed so limited that my
assignment was to produce a research
paper of no more than 30 doublespaced typed pages; I was to give
the project half time for about three
months. This was the beginning of an
ever growing enterprise that would
continue for some five years, and in
the later stages, as we prepared the
air force volume for press, become
something more than a full-time
commitment.
Almost immediately the subject
took on a life of its own. It was indeed
true that the air force had played a
supporting role to the navy in the
St. Lawrence. The navy, however,
relied upon aircraft as the principal
means for reinforcing the thinlystretched warship escorts for gulf
shipping, and more particularly for
searching out the submarines and
striking back at them while the few
warships available ”held the goal
posts” close around the merchant
ship convoys. During 1942, when
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/7

U-boats first attacked in the gulf, it
became a leading commitment for
Eastern Air Command, absorbing 40
percent and more of the command’s
flying effort despite its primary tasks
in the protection of Atlantic convoys.
Developments in the gulf confronted
both the air force and navy leadership
with the need more fully to integrate
their services’ efforts, and the St.
Lawrence became something of a
laboratory for the development of
more effective cooperation between
warships and aircraft in antisubmarine warfare.
In retrospect it is easy to say
”we should have known” about the
scale and importance of the air effort
in the gulf. Peter Moon’s account
of Paul Hartwig’s 1942 mission in
The Canadian Magazine recounted
Hartwig’s memories – since fully
confirmed by German documents
– about how his U-boat had been
relentlessly hunted by RCAF
bombers, and very nearly destroyed.
Moon’s emphasis on Hartwig’s
success tended to downplay the air
force’s response, however. Writers
and readers in the 1970s were by
no means alone in this emphasis.
In the 1980s I found the report of
Hartwig’s interrogation by British
intelligence officers when he was
captured following the destruction of
his submarine by British forces in the
eastern Atlantic in November 1942.
The reaction of Canadian staff officers
when they received this report early
in 1943 was a sense of frustration and
failure because the numerous attacks
on Hartwig’s boat had not destroyed
it, or even broken the fighting spirit
of the crew.9
What was missing in the 1970s,
and of course in 1942-3, was context
that could only come from German
records and close co-relation of
the information they contained
with the most detailed reports
available on Canadian air and naval
operations. The salient point that
emerged from that analysis was that
Eastern Air Command reinforced and

reorganized its effort in response to
the initial run of success by U-517
and its consort, U-165, in late August
and early September 1942. U-165,
having exhausted its complement
of torpedoes, headed for home on
16 September – and warned U-boat
headquarters about the effective air
cover.10 U-517, by contrast, was only
half way through its six-week mission,
but was unable, despite repeated
and aggressive efforts, to make any
further successful attacks. More
than that, Eastern Air Command’s
new methods were instrumental in
greatly limiting the success of three
other submarines that immediately
followed Hartwig into the gulf to
the destruction of a total of only
three ships, and persuaded a fourth
U-boat not even to attempt to enter.
Tragically, one of the three ships
lost was the Newfoundland Railway
ferry Caribou, destroyed by U-69
on the night of 13-14 October 1942,
while the passenger ship was making
its regular crossing of the Cabot
Strait between North Sydney, Cape
Breton Island and Port-aux-Basques,
Newfoundland. This disaster, in
which 136 people perished, many of
them women and children, confirmed
for the public, the military and the
government that the defence of the
St. Lawrence was a failure. German
records, however, added a vital
additional element. U-69 had in fact
been driven from the St. Lawrence by
Eastern Air Command’s effective air
patrols, and was lurking in the Cabot
Strait so she could quickly escape into
the safety of the open ocean.
More generally, it was not until
Canadian and other researchers
began to re-examine the whole
history of maritime air power in the
Second World War in the late 1970s
and 1980s that two crucial elements
of broader context became apparent.
The first was the enormous technical
difficulties encountered by Britain,
then the leading maritime air power,
and the United States air forces in
aerial anti-submarine operations.
69
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An RCAF Consolidated Canso or Catalina flying boat from the after deck of a Fairmile motor launch showing its depth charge
armament, at Gaspé, June 1943. Fairmiles and Cansos/Catalinas based at Gaspé supported St. Lawrence convoys in the dangerous
middle part of their passage where the narrow waters of the estuary allowed U-boats most readily to locate and attack shipping.

No air force was dependably able
to destroy submarines until the
latter part of 1942, and Eastern Air
Command did as well as the larger
Allied air forces. Second, it was only
this fresh analysis of the larger Allied
effort that established the special
difficulties that Eastern Air Command
faced. It was well behind the other
Allied air forces in both modern
equipment and trained personnel, the
result of the Canadian air force – and
the Canadian government – giving
absolute priority to the recruitment
and training of tens of thousands of
personnel for the Royal Air Force’s
combat commands in Britain.
Still, how could Canada’s large
air effort in the gulf, one of the big
stories of the war on Canada’s shores,
slip into such obscurity? One reason
is that no one looked. When the RCAF
official history program went on the
70 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
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chopping block in the late 1940s,
the only reasonably full account of
Eastern Air Command was a very
preliminary chronology assembled
by a member of the wartime historical
section to provide a basic reference
for the authors of the official history
volumes that were never written.
The chronology, some 900 pages of
legal-sized typescript pages in length,
organizes each of the wartime years
into four chapters, each covering a
three-month period. The quarterly
chapters in turn comprise sections
on each of the command’s bases and
the squadrons at those bases. Most
of the material is a ”scissors and
paste” compilation of extracts from
the daily diaries kept by these units.
These diaries vary widely in content
and quality, depending entirely
upon how the officer assigned the
task chose to fill in the forms. Some

provided only a line on the weather
conditions, and a bare-bones listing
of the aircraft that flew. Others,
who took the job more seriously,
included notes on personnel posted
or departing, training programs,
digests of intelligence received on
enemy operations, information on
the purpose and results of each
aircraft mission, and sometimes
annexed copies of important orders
and reports.
The greatest challenge in grasping
the main threads from the diffuse
chronological history derives from
the very nature of air operations,
and, in particular, air operations on
Canada’s east coast. The navy rather
than the air force determined the
shape of the maritime air campaign.
It was the navy that controlled the
merchant shipping that the enemy
was endeavouring to attack. It was
7
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the navy that gathered and analyzed
intelligence about enemy threats.
On that basis, it was the navy that
planned and controlled operations.
The navy’s fundamental defence
measure for friendly shipping was
to collect vessels together into
convoys. Merchant ships sailing
singly provided a string of vulnerable
targets to the enemy. Submarines
could hunt one ship and then another
without fear of retribution. Even
if the victim managed to radio for
help, aircraft and warships usually
could not reach the scene for at least
an hour or more, ample time for
the submarine quickly to run from
the area, dive and wait till the coast
was clear, once again free to seek
out another target. If those same
merchant ships were sailed together
in a convoy, then escort warships
and aircraft could be concentrated
around that convoy. In order to
sink merchant ships in convoy,
the enemy submarines had to face
those defending forces. The primary
defence of a convoy was the group
of warships that provided the ”close
escort.” These vessels remained
constantly with the convoy, day and
night and in all weathers. The most
senior warship commander, the
”senior officer of the escort” directed
all defence operations, including
missions by aircraft dispatched by
headquarters on shore to assist the
convoy.
One of the greatest virtues
of aircraft, their rapid mobility,
also makes historical analysis of
operations difficult. In the early
1940s a single squadron of ten or
15 aircraft could simultaneously
undertake different missions in
widely separated areas hundreds
of miles from the squadron’s home
base. A single convoy, or a particular
area where intelligence suggested a
submarine might be lurking, might
receive coverage by aircraft from
two or more squadrons from two
or more bases on a single day. If
need be, aircraft from squadrons at
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/7

the larger bases could within hours
fly to another station closer to the
scene for detached operations that
might continue for days or weeks,
depending on enemy activity. In
other words, a single air squadron,
in contrast to army units and naval
escort groups, was seldom assigned
to carry out a complete operation of
several days’ or weeks’ duration. It
is often necessary to sift through the
records of many squadrons with an
eagle eye in order to discover among
the scores or even hundreds of flights
recorded (often in incomplete form)
the air missions that supported a
particular convoy. Moreover, to make
any real sense of the air missions –
why they were ordered and what
they were expected to accomplish – it
is necessary to track down the full
naval records of that convoy.
There were, as it turned out,
special opportunities, but equally
frustrating obstacles, in carrying
out this kind of research in the early
1980s. Incredible as it may seem, there
was no published model of what the
history of an air command engaged
in the Battle of the Atlantic might
look like. The British official history,
The War at Sea, four fat volumes
produced by Captain S.W. Roskill
in 1954-61, told the stories of all the
armed services engaged. As a result
the treatment of the RAF's Coastal
Command is merged in with the more
extensive account of the Royal Navy’s
predominant role. The American
published histories similarly do not
give a focussed, detailed account
but for different reasons. There was
no separate American air force. The
army and navy each had their own
aviation branches, and maritime air
operations receive brief treatment
in the service histories. The Army
Air Forces did produce their own
six-volume official history, but, in
the fall of 1942, the army turned
its responsibility for shore-based
maritime aviation over to the navy.
Fortunately, the British did
produce a typescript history, ”The

R.A.F. in Maritime War,” for the
internal use of the military staffs and
as a supporting study for Captain
Roskill’s published official history.
More fortunately still, ”The R.A.F.
in Maritime War” had been released
to the archives in the 1970s. This
massive, fully referenced study
became one of the models for the
Eastern Air Command chapters
of the new RCAF official history.
Significantly in light of the fact
that the British, the pioneers in
maritime aviation, had discovered
that maritime air forces could only be
effective if they operated under naval
control, the author was Captain D.V.
Peyton Ward, RN, the naval liaison
officer to the RAF Coastal Command
during the war.11
Peyton Ward’s work confirmed
what the Canadian official historians
had already discovered in writing
the first volume of the RCAF official
history in the late 1960s and 1970s,
on the role of Canadian airmen in
the British flying services during
the First World War. 12 (Syd Wise
was the senior author, and Alec
Douglas undertook the work on
maritime aviation.) Squadron and
base records of the sort used for the
Eastern Air Command narrative
were useful mainly for specific
detail. The information that would
tell a coherent story could only be
obtained in the records of major
regional commands, and the national
armed services ministries. These
senior headquarters set policy and
coordinated action for everything
from the recruitment and training
of personnel, to the acquisition of
aircraft and other equipment, to the
construction of base facilities, and
development of tactical methods.
Some may imagine government
records management in terms of
lavish facilities that embody the
commitment to preserve the saga
of the nation. While it is true that
governments devote more effort
to records management than by
almost any other agency, the effort
71
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is never equal to the challenge, and
impressive only in comparison to the
neglect of records in most places at
most times. People are far too busy
with the consuming pressures of
day to day life to give much thought
to records; all too often at work, as
at home, we tend to stuff old letters
or invoices that have been paid into
drawers or boxes in no particular
order, and then chuck things out
when the drawers begin to jam or the
attic is chock-a-block. Much historical
research, especially into areas that
have been little studied – the research
that is the most fun – bears a closer
resemblance to the annual panic
to find income tax receipts amidst
the detritus at the bottom of the
briefcase and in various kitchen
drawers than to the caricature of the
tweedy academic calmly perusing
well ordered tomes. The neat thing
about the Directorate of History in
the early 1980s was that its row on
row of musty cabinets created the
atmosphere of a mystery-filled attic
in a 1940s film-noir, while it truly did
represent – and does so today with its
updated archival shelving and acidfree documents boxes – management
of paper records that is about as good
as it gets.

The Eastern Air Command
files that survived were all at the
Directorate of History, in the banks
of olive drab cabinets. These files
are excellent, but selective and
incomplete. The members of the
original air force team that had
arranged for their retention in the
1940s apparently chose only the
most obviously significant items,
attempting in the interest of economy
to avoid excessive duplication by
relying upon the files of Air Force
Headquarters (AFHQ) in Ottawa as
the primary record. Most the AFHQ
files had been accessioned by the
Public Archives (now Library and
Archives Canada), meaning that they
could be ordered from the archives
reading room on Wellington Street,
and delivered there within a matter
of hours. The finding aids, excellent
for the early 1980s, consisted of typewritten or handwritten lists, arranged
according to the original numbering
of the files, and giving the title of
the file. The lists run to hundreds of
pages, and the only search engine
was ”by finger” – going through the
lists page by page, entry by entry, and
manually noting those of potential
interest. As in any file system, the
file titles capture the contents with

greatly varying degrees of accuracy,
and it was therefore essential to err
on the side of caution by calling up
any item whose title suggested the
faintest link with the research subject.
There were significant gaps in
coverage by the files at the archives.
Some of the missing items turned
up in the Federal Records Centre, a
warehouse at the Tunney’s Pasture
complex of federal government
buildings in the west end of Ottawa
where files that might still have
information required for ongoing
issues were stored under the
physical charge of the archives,
while remaining the property of
the department that created them.
Still others finally came to light in
the file storage of the department
under new numbers. Their subjects,
such as a key file on the overall air
defence of Canada, had a continuing
relevance for policy, and therefore
they had been renumbered according
to recent filing systems. The files still
under the department’s control, at
the Federal Record Centre and in
the department’s own storage, often
proved the most difficult to find.
There were no inventory lists, like
those created by the Public Archives
for the records it accessioned, and the
only finding aids were the original
index cards used by the contemporary
records managers. Many of the cards
consisted of scribbled notations
used by clerks in filing incoming
correspondence, and there were
only one or two older members of
the records management staff whose
experience reached back far enough
for them to be able, with considerable
effort, to correlate the information on
the cards to file storage locations. In
the case of the main AFHQ subject
file on the defence of the Gulf of
St. Lawrence, we were able to track
U-517 crash dives as seen from Flying
Officer Maurice Belanger’s Lockheed
Hudson during its attack run on 29
September 1942. The Gaspé coast is in
the background.
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U-165 under attack on 9 September
1942 by a Lockheed Hudson of 113
Squadron, piloted by Pilot Officer Robert
S. Keetley.

down the original file control card,
only to discover that the file had been
reported missing sometime in the
1950s. It never did surface.
Because the maritime air
operations supported the navy, and
the navy’s published operational
history was based on research that was
incomplete, there had to be extensive
work in navy records as well. The
extended chronological narrative on
the Battle of the Atlantic that wartime
naval historical officers had written,
and Joseph Schull had used for The
Far Distant Ships, has some of the
same strengths and weaknesses as
the Eastern Air Command narrative.
It is less discursive than the air force
chronology because of the navy’s
directing role in maritime operations
that made salient events stand out
more clearly. The historical officers
were thus able to trim a good deal of
detail about administrative matters
and routine operations, the sort
of bits and pieces that even while
obscuring the main elements of the
Eastern Air Command story provide
insight into daily life and work-a-day
problems at the command’s bases.
The records of commanding
officer Atlantic Coast (COAC), the
regional navy command at Halifax
that corresponded to Eastern Air
Command, are voluminous. They
had been saved in a nick of time by
the Naval Historical Section in the
mid-1960s when cutbacks that closed
down the warehouses where they
were stored had initially brought a
program of wholesale destruction.
In 1981 these files were just being
accessioned by the archives and
their structure and contents were
largely unknown. Very large blocks
of wartime files from Naval Service
Headquarters (NSHQ) had been kept
open and in use to the early 1960s,
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/7

and these in the early 1980s were
in the midst of transfer from DND
and the Federal Records Centre to
the archives. Even more than in the
case of the Air Force Headquarters
records, a good deal of time was
required to discover which files
still existed and what their general
contents were.
Alec had three special interests
for the Eastern Air Command
chapters. What was the German side
of the story, and in particular how
effective or ineffective were Canadian
operations from the German
perspective? What intelligence was
available to the Canadian forces and
how did this information influence
operations? Finally, what advanced
technology did the Canadian forces
possess, especially aircraft mounted
anti-submarine radar in the case of
Eastern Air Command, and how did
it contribute to Canadian operations?
These were the main elements
missing from The Far Distant Ships,
and for some years had been the basis
of Alec’s own research.
Faced with a subject I knew little
about, and a mass of records that
were entirely new to me, I searched
for some sort of point of entry, some
method of identifying what was
important. The objective of Eastern

Air Command’s operations in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence was to prevent
the U-boats from attacking shipping.
The key task, therefore, was to
find out precisely what impact the
command’s operations had on the
enemy, and thus the essential first
source was the German records.
This approach focussed the seven
month campaign in 1942, from May
through November, to 22 events: the
12 occasions on which the submarines
had successfully attacked shipping,
and the ten occasions on which
aircraft had made attacks in which
there was good reason to conclude
the target had been a U-boat, and not
one of the many – countless – false
contacts resulting from the large
amounts of flotsam on the surface of
the water in the gulf, and the frequent
fogs and mists. These 22 events were
a much more manageable research
agenda than the hundreds of often
poorly recorded flights Canadian
aircraft had made in the gulf in
support of over a hundred merchant
ship convoys, whose records were
also incomplete in many instances.
By the early 1980s we knew the
identity of most of the U-boats that
had operated in the gulf (those other
than the famous U-517) and when
they had operated there through
73
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work by Professor-Doctor Jürgen
Rohwer, director of the Library of
Contemporary History in Stuttgart,
Germany. Rohwer was a junior
officer in the German navy during
the war. He served in minesweepers,
and as Allied ground forces closed
in on his ship’s base in the spring of
1945 he joined a group of seamen who
organized themselves as an infantry
unit and took to the countryside to
fight the invaders. He had never
surrendered to the enemy, bearing
arms until the government of Hitler’s
successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz,
capitulated. In his subsequent
academic career he became one of
the first non-government scholars
to analyze the large body of U-boat
records that survived the war. One of
his projects was to correlate U-boat
attack records with Allied shipping
records to determine precisely which
ships had been under attack, which
attacks had been effective, and those
that had missed.13 Rohwer was in
correspondence with the Canadian
Naval Historical Section in the early
1960s for assistance with his work on
U-boat attacks in Canadian waters,
and on transatlantic convoys that had
been under Canadian escort. At the
same time, he assisted the Canadian
historians by helping to identify the
U-boats that had been the target of
attacks by Canadian forces.
Taking these 22 instances of
confirmed contact with U-boats, I
was able to push into the Canadian
air and naval records with a series
of questions. In the case of U-boat
attacks on shipping, had there
been an aircraft in the vicinity? If
so, aircraft from which squadron,
from what base, and what was the
aircraft’s mission? If the aircraft
was operating on detached duty
at a base within the gulf, when
had that special detachment been
established and why? If no aircraft
was present why was that the case?
Had air protection been ordered, and
if so why had it not been provided?
What was the response of Canadian
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naval and air forces to the submarine
attack? What reinforcements came,
from what bases and with what
orders? In the case of air attacks on
U-boats, the questions were similar,
but with additional ones about how
the aircraft had located the U-boat.
Did the aircraft have intelligence
that a U-boat was in the area? What
was the source of that intelligence?
Was the aircraft equipped with
radar, and did this help in making
contact with the submarine? The
great challenge was in building up
as full a picture as possible of air
operations on the days of the crucial
events, and, to give essential context
about the command’s procedures and
capabilities, on the days immediately
preceding and following those events.
It quickly became apparent that
in 1942 Eastern Air Command was
still in the early stages of expansion.
When the first U-boat struck in the
gulf in May 1942, the command
had only four fully organized antisubmarine squadrons equipped
with modern aircraft; additional
aircraft and aircrew were just arriving
to re-equip a fifth squadron, and
organize additional units. Even
with the hastening of these efforts (a
direct response to the appearance of
submarines in the gulf as it turned
out), the command was woefully
short of aircraft and trained aircrew.
For this reason, much of the flying
in the gulf was done by aircraft
sent for single missions from the
main Atlantic coast bases, or special
detachments of two or three bombing
aircraft sent for a period of days or
weeks to training airfields within
the gulf or on the St. Lawrence River.
Often the aircraft on detachment
were rotated back to their home
base for maintenance, and replaced
by other aircraft, sometimes from
the same squadron, sometimes from
another unit.
This constant shuffle of
individual aircraft or small
detachments from many bases and
squadrons in what were frequently

emergency conditions following a
U-boat attack explained why the
story of Eastern Air Command’s
role had for so long remained so
obscure. There exists no consolidated
source recording missions in the
gulf and detachments to temporary
bases in the gulf. Certainly there are
valuable passages in the Eastern Air
Command narrative history, and in
the base and squadron diaries upon
which the narrative was largely
based, but these are buried in other
material covering the whole range of
the command’s activities. Even these
passages are not necessarily complete
or fully accurate.
Without realizing it, I was getting
a particularly clear lesson about
one of the basic rules of research
into military operations. The most
dependable sources are signals
exchanged by radio, or, in the case
of headquarters by telegraph or
teletype, by participants during the
event. In the Canadian air force and
navy these messages were typed by
communications staff at the various
headquarters onto pink forms some
six to eight inches in length and eight
inches wide with the originator and
recipients at the top. Right after the
text was the precise time (to the
minute) and date the originator sent
the message, which served as its
reference number. At the bottom of
the form were one or two time-date
groups which indicated when the
addressee received the message,
and, if it was in cypher, when it
was decyphered. The advantage of
the messages as a source is that by
definition they record precisely what
was known by participants during
the course of the events. A squadron
or base war diary might well have
been written up days after the event
by an officer who may not have been
privy to all the details; even if he had
been, his account would inevitably
be coloured by his knowledge about
how things turned out, and by the
practical need to select and condense
material for the written account. The
11
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principles of research into military
operations are thus virtually identical
to those of police investigations or
legal proceedings: the best evidence
is that directly from participants
gathered as close to the event as
possible.
The first important breakthrough
in the project was the discovery that
Eastern Air Command (EAC) sent
a daily signal of several pages in
length to the Air Ministry in Britain
and AFHQ, listing all missions
flown that day, missions ordered
that had been cancelled or curtailed
by weather or equipment defects,
and, a list of missions ordered
for the following day. The latter
was of particular importance for
it gave a fair indication where the
command suspected U-boats were
operating, and thus what intelligence
was available. No single complete
collection of these signals exists, but
a reasonably full run can be pieced
together from various dockets that
survive in the AFHQ records at the
archives and in EAC records at the
Directorate of History. Some dockets,
however, report areas patrolled in a
letter code for which a key no longer
exists, making it impossible to discern
which flights were in the gulf. In these
cases, the better squadron diaries
and weekly and monthly reports
helped fill in the information. In all
cases, the signals reported flights by
squadron, not mission, so there was
no alterative but to go through each
page, line by line, to identify missions
over the gulf.
The main work for my initial
gulf report was to build a list of all
missions in the gulf, for the periods in
which there were confirmed contacts
with the U-boats. For each mission
listed, I endeavoured to identify the
aircraft, its squadron, the base it was
operating from, the time it took off,
the time it landed, and geographical
area the patrol covered, and, course,
as much information as I could find
on any special occurrence during
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the flight, particularly an actual or
possible sighting of a U-boat.
Naval records, the essential
context for the air missions, also had
to be stitched together from many
places. Naval Service Headquarters
maintained master files of convoy
reports, but as a space saving measure
these were microfilmed in the early
1950s and the originals destroyed.
Few of the files are complete. There
were many series of coastal convoys
in Canadian waters, on the Atlantic
coast as well as in the gulf, most
of which were established as an
emergency response to U-boat attacks
so arrangements, including record
keeping, were necessarily improvised
and informal. Many of the signals
were barely legible file copies, and
are unreadable on the microfilm.
Fortunately, the Naval Historical
Section saved two filing cabinets of
signals held by the Trade Division
of NSHQ, the office of the naval staff
that oversaw the organization of all
convoys. Again, the quality of the
file copies is poor, but most can be
deciphered. At the archives some
reports missing from the microfilms
turned up in scattered files in the
COAC collection.
The greatest pleasure of the
work, aside from the excitement of
new discoveries, was the collegial
atmosphere. A group of six or seven
historians would gather for coffee
breaks and brown-bag lunches to
share findings and frustrations.
Regular participants who mentored
my efforts included M.V. ”Vince”
Bezeau (who was working on
Western Air Command), Carl Christie
(Ferry Command, and operations
from Newfoundland), Owen Cooke
(archivist), Ben Greenhous (British
Commonwealth Air Training Plan),
and Steve Harris (air force policy).14
The spirit of collaboration also came
from the bosses, Norman Hillmer
who supervised the research and
was the overall editor of the volume,
and Alec Douglas, the senior author,
who received our edited reports from

Norman. The whole team, with Alec
in the chair, met in seminar to review
newly completed reports, and Alec
and Norman closely consulted the
authors of reports about how their
work was being trimmed and shaped
for the final chapters.
Far from telling me to wrap
things up, Alec and Norman asked
me to pursue leads. In the end, my
report on Eastern Air Command in
the St. Lawrence in 1942 took over a
year of part-time work to complete,
and filled 117 typescript pages. Nor
was that the end of it. The final
section of the report detailed how
the dramatic sinking of ships close
to Canadian soil had created such
alarm among the population, and
consternation for the military and the
government, that the development
of more effective defences for the
gulf became a top priority for the
1943 shipping season. There was
little German activity in Canadian
waters that year, and indeed the
main story was how Eastern Air
Command extended its operations far
into the central and eastern Atlantic
successfully to engage U-boats in
some of the most important convoy
battles of the war. During 1944,
however, the U-boats returned in
strength to Canadian waters. They
achieved far fewer sinkings than in
1942, but they continued to destroy
warships and merchant ships right
up until the last weeks of the war.
Two of the most dramatic submarine
attacks were again in the gulf: severe
damage to the frigate HMCS Magog
by U-1223 on 14 October 1944, and
the destruction of the corvette HMCS
Shawinigan with the loss of all 91
members of her crew by U-1228 on
the night of 23-24 November 1944.
Alec asked me to carry on with
the gulf story in 1943-5. It did not
look like a promising subject. During
the period August to December
1944 when the U-boats renewed the
offensive in the St. Lawrence, aircraft
did not make a single confirmed
sighting of a submarine, let alone an
75
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HMCS Magog under tow after the frigate was hit by a torpedo from U-1223 on 14
October 1944. The explosion demolished the 20-metre-long after section of the hull.
Note the buckled remnants of the upper deck of the stern part of the ship, folded over
top of the surviving superstructure.

attack. Yet, aircraft were extremely
active in the gulf. In an effort to
relate this flying effort to the U-boat
patrols, I plotted the areas covered
by the aircraft each day against the
tracks of the submarines. Work in
the German records to produce these
plots soon showed why the aircraft
made no contacts. So great was the
threat from land-based aviation that
submarines ran almost continuously
submerged when in North American
coastal waters during the latter part
of 1944 and early 1945. Because of
well-founded fears that Allied radio
direction-finding stations could
locate the source of transmissions
and quickly home aircraft to the
position, the Germans operated in
radio silence. While U-boats were
still crossing the central ocean they
exchanged signals with headquarters
to receive their orders for North
American coastal operations, and
the submarines rarely signalled
again until they had completed their
mission and withdrawn back out
into the central ocean. As a result
the actual daily positions in the
U-boat logs are in many cases quite
different from the estimated positions
shown in the diary kept at U-boat
headquarters, which often had no
word of a submarine’s progress for
several weeks.
In the Canadian records there
were two exciting finds. In the
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summer of 1943 the newly expanded
Operational Intelligence Centre at
Naval Service Headquarters began
to issue to the east coast commands
a high classified daily signal codenamed ”Otter.” It listed U-boats
operating in the western Atlantic,
and the areas where each might be
patrolling for the next 24 hours. The
daily operations reports signals from
Eastern Air Command showed that
the missions ordered for air patrols
were to cover the areas identified in
the Otter signals. Most strikingly,
for many days the estimated U-boat
positions given in the Otter signals
corresponded to the estimated
positions in the U-boat headquarters
diary. We knew from the early
releases by the British archives of
material on Ultra intelligence that
after the blackout through much of
1942, the British had managed to
break into U-boat radio traffic once
more, and, with American assistance,
were subsequently able to decrypt
many signals within a matter of a
few hours. Could it be that Naval
Service Headquarters in Ottawa
was receiving Ultra intelligence,
and this was the basis of the Otter
signals? There were a few instances
in the Otter signals that provided
more definite clues. Normally the
Otter signals were dispatched in the
evening to allow east coast staffs time
to plan and order missions for the next

day. On a few occasions special Otter
signals went out at other times of the
day with an urgent amendment to
one of the estimated U-boat positions
dispatched the previous evening. On
checking the German sources I found
that on several of these occasions
U-boat headquarters had sent new
instructions to U-boats already on
patrol in North American waters.
The timing of these signals was
only hours before a corresponding
special Otter signal. Alec, who in
joint projects with Jürgen Rohwer
had undertaken some of the first
detailed academic work on the role
of Ultra intelligence in the battle of
the Atlantic, knew the British sources
thoroughly. Fortunately, decrypts
of U-boat signals for the latter part
of the war had just been released
to the archives. Alec took the list
of the special Otter signals to the
UK archives, and discovered that
in each case the British had indeed
promptly decrypted the U-boat
headquarters tasking signals we had
located in the German records. These
discoveries left no doubt that Ottawa
was immediately receiving the latest
Ultra decrypts and quickly analyzing
them for the direction of Canadian
operations.
The basic research on 1943-5
revealed that German operations in
Canadian waters were on a larger
scale than had been previously
known. There were five U-boats who
patrolled in the Gulf of St. Lawrence
in the late summer and fall of 1944,
a scale of effort that matched the
1942 campaign. This was part of
broader effort in Canadian and
Newfoundland waters that during
the period October 1943 to May 1945
included extended patrols in coastal
areas by more than 20 German
submarines. During these months
shipping traffic from Canadian
ports, including the St. Lawrence,
was particularly heavy to support
the build up of troops, equipment
and supplies in Great Britain for
the Allied invasion of France at
13
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Normandy on 6 June 1944, and then
to sustain the advance by the Allied
forces into Germany. Yet, in contrast
to 1942, the U-boats sank or damaged
only three ships in the St. Lawrence.
The discovery about the importance
of ”Otter” signals in the gulf – to keep
aircraft on constant patrol over top
of the probable positions of U-boats
revealed as we now suspected by
Ultra intelligence – provided a clue
about how the Canadian forces held
the submarines at bay.
Alec asked me in 1983 to work
up drafts for the whole of Eastern
Air Command during the last 18
months of the war using the Otter
signals and the Ultra signals released
by the British. The results were
fascinating. During 1942, when no
Ultra intelligence had been available,
the Canadian forces had been blind.
Most often the first firm intelligence
about the arrival of a new U-boat in
Canadian waters, or the movement of
a boat from one zone to another was
the sudden destruction of merchant
ships. By contrast, starting in the fall
of 1943, the RCAF’s new ”very long
range” Consolidated Liberator fourengine bombers, based at Gander,
Newfoundland, began to overfly the
suspected U-boat tracks when the
submarines were still hundreds of
miles out in the ocean, just beginning
the approach towards Canadian
waters. Other aircraft from other
bases took over as the U-boat entered
their area, the baton being passed
from base to base. When warships
were available, or when, as rarely
happened, the U-boat revealed its
exact position by attacking or making
a radio signal, the Canadian forces
organized joint air-sea hunts. On
every occasion in which the U-boats
managed to attack, it turned out that
efforts to keep air and sea patrols over
the tracks of the submarines had gone
awry because of a failure in Ultra
intelligence, or because the U-boat
commander had not followed his
orders and deviated far from the plot
kept by U-boat headquarters – and
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/7

the Allied intelligence staffs whose
U-boat plots were by that stage in the
war as good and in some cases better
than the Germans’ own.
The work in feeding the new
intelligence research and analysis
into the Eastern Air Command
chapters of the official history of the
RCAF in 1983-5 was particularly
exciting because it figured directly
in the ”renaissance” of Canadian
naval history. I now had a partner in
the project, Marc Milner. Marc hails
from Sackville, New Brunswick,
and I knew we had a true maritimer
on staff when he came in late one
morning and announced ”Bin to the
dentist. He cleaned my teeth – and
my wallet.” I’m told Marc and I have
certain maritime traits in common:
barrel chest and a constitutional
inability to keep a shirt tucked in, a
lot of hand gestures while talking, fly
away hair (still the case with Marc,
but mine has mostly departed during
the intervening decades), and a way
of slurring words that isn’t quite
the most beautiful Queen’s English.
Alec not infrequently got us mixed
up, I think at one point to referring
to Roger Milner, but I can’t swear to
that. Marc had recently completed
his PhD thesis, the first account of

the Royal Canadian Navy in the
Battle of the Atlantic that drew on
the full archives opened in the 1970s
in Canada, Britain and the United
States. That was the basis of his first
book, North Atlantic Run: The Royal
Canadian Navy and the Battle for the
Convoys, 1939-43, published in 1985.
Alec, Marc and I all were in
regular touch with Michael Hadley,
a professor of German literature
at the University of Victoria and a
captain in the naval reserve. Michael,
in the early 1980s, combined his
interests in a study of the U-boats
that operated in Canadian waters
during the war. He was in contact
with several of the surviving U-boat
commanders, and shared stories with
us of his encounters with the German
veterans, together with copies of the
wartime documents they provided
him. Michael’s U-Boats against Canada
appeared in 1985, at the same time as
Marc’s book. They did a combined
book-launch tour, but I think Marc
was on his own in his native New
Brunswick where he was the guest
on a phone-in radio talk show. This
should have been a moment of glory
for a down-homer who had done
good in Upper Canada – with the
University of Toronto Press, no less.
This is Marc’s account, as well as I
can recall it after 24 years. Caller: ”So
you live up there in Ottawa now?”
Marc: ”Yes.” Caller: ”So you know a
lot of big people up there?” Marc: ”I,
er...” Caller: ”Well I want you to give
a message to that Brian Mulroney...”
In 1986, the year after Marc
Milner’s and Michael Hadley’s books
were published, Alec Douglas’s The
Creation of a National Air Force: The
Official History of the Royal Canadian
Air Force Volume II came out. It is
a hefty tome of 797 pages. About a
quarter of the book, six chapters, tell
the story of Eastern Air Command.
The Gulf of St. Lawrence campaign of
1942 had been elevated to a chapter
of its own, and the operations in
1944 got part of another chapter. It
was these chapters, informed by the
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work of Hadley, Milner, Rohwer and
others, that provided the first account
of the battle of the St. Lawrence to be
built from the full range of archival
records. The maritime chapters in
the air force history, as intended,
subsequently became the basis for
the fuller account in the new official
history of the navy, which got under
way in 1987. In an uncanny repetition
of history, deep cuts in the defence
budget stalled the naval project
during the last half of the 1990s, and
delayed publication of the Second
World War volumes until 2002
and 2007.15 The chapters on the St.
Lawrence in those tomes reflect
considerable additional research,
and raised issues for further work.
Still, when I sat down in 2008 to
begin War in the St. Lawrence, and
dug through the boxes of files and
note cards accumulated in fits and
starts over nearly three decades, I
realized that it was the experience at
the directorate in the early eighties
that laid the foundation and provided
the inspiration for the new book.
Time and again I felt once more the
excitement of discovery of that early
research. One of the main objectives
in writing the new book was to try to
capture that excitement.
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